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Abstract
Background: Public Private Partnerships (PPP) are increasingly utilized as a public health strategy for strengthening
health systems and have become a core component for the delivery of TB control services in India, as promoted
through national policy. However, partnerships are complex systems that rely on relationships between a myriad of
different actors with divergent agendas and backgrounds. Relationship is a crucial element of governance, and
relationship building an important aspect of partnerships. To understand PPPs a multi-disciplinary perspective that
draws on insights from social theory is needed. This paper demonstrates how social theory can aid the
understanding of the complex relationships of actors involved in implementation of Public-Private Mix (PPM)-TB
policy in India.
Methods: Ethnographic research was conducted within a district in a Southern state of India over a 14 month
period, combining participant observations, informal interactions and in-depth interviews with a wide range of
respondents across public, private and non-government organisation (NGO) sectors.
Results: Drawing on the theoretical insights from Bourdieu’s “theory of practice” this study explores the
relationships between the different actors. The study found that programme managers, frontline TB workers, NGOs,
and private practitioners all had a crucial role to play in TB partnerships. They were widely regarded as valued
contributors with distinct social skills and capabilities within their organizations and professions. However, their
potential contributions towards programme implementation tended to be unrecognized both at the top and
bottom of the policy implementation chain. These actors constantly struggled for recognition and used different
mechanisms to position themselves alongside other actors within the programme that further complicated the
relationships between different actors.
Conclusion: This paper demonstrates that applying social theory can enable a better understanding of the complex
relationship across public, private and NGO sectors. A closer understanding of these processes is a prerequisite for
bridging the gap between field-level practices and central policy intentions, facilitating a move towards more effective
partnership strategies for strengthening local health systems. The study contributes to our understanding of
implementation of PPP for TB control and builds knowledge to help policy makers and programme managers
strengthen and effectively implement strategies to enable stronger governance of these partnerships.
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Background
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) are increasingly pro-
moted in India and globally as an innovative strategy for
strengthening local health systems [1]. Such partnerships
are specifically recognized to be important in the signifi-
cant scaling up of essential services needed to achieve the
national and the global visions espoused by Universal
Health Coverage (UHC), itself highlighted within the Sus-
tainable Development Goals (SDGs) [2]. For the purpose
of this paper, partnership is broadly considered to indicate
inter-organizational relationships and collaborations in-
volving individuals and organizations from the public, pri-
vate and NGO sectors for delivering better healthcare.
Engaging all relevant healthcare providers in TB care and
control through public-private mix (PPM)1 approaches is,
for example, considered an essential component of the
WHO’s Stop TB Strategy [3, 4]. As per the Global TB re-
port 2017 India is one among the five countries (in de-
scending order - India, Indonesia, China, the Philippines
and Pakistan) having the largest number of incident cases
in 2016 which together accounted for 56% of the global
total [5]. In 2016, the estimated incidence of TB in India
was approximately 2.8 million accounting for about a
quarter of the global burden of TB [6]. The Revised Na-
tional Tuberculosis Control Programme (RNTCP) in India
employs a comprehensive approach, involving a wide
range of public and private providers previously not linked
to the TB control programme [7, 8]. National PPM-TB
policy for engagement with the private sector has been a
core component in the TB control strategy for more than
a decade [9, 10]. The partnership initiatives under the
PPM-TB policy broadly aims to strengthen the referral
systems between the public, the private and NGO sectors
to reach out to more patients and to provide standardized
diagnosis and treatment [11]. RNTCP has established
Designated Microscopy Centres (DMCs) across the coun-
try, but accessibility to DMCs in difficult to reach areas re-
mains to be sub-optimal. It is envisaged that NGO/private
provider supported sputum collection centres can be
established to enhance equity and provide ease of accessi-
bility to patients [12].
In order to maximize the health benefits of partner-
ships and strengthen local health systems, Widdus
(2003) asserts that it is important to understand the im-
plementation of public-private partnerships [13]. This
can provide the basis for thinking through how to enable
stronger governance of these partnerships - understand-
ing governance as encompassing concern for the man-
agement of these relationships in implementation to
support the achievement of their goals [14]. However,
current evaluations of PPPs mostly focus on global and
national level experience [15, 16], with limited attention
paid to how ‘individual partnerships’ work and play out
at the local level – that is, considering how they are
perceived and how they are put into practice [17, 18].
Available studies of PPP implementation [19–22] also
fall short in providing an adequate picture of the day to
day implementation of partnerships at the local level,
demonstrating little understanding of the relationships
between different actors. Yet partnerships are complex
systems that rely on relationships between a myriad of
different actors with divergent agendas and backgrounds.
In their analysis of Indian TB partnerships, Ogden and
Porter (2000), for example, placed emphasis on relation-
ship building as an important aspect of partnerships
[23]. Similarly, Ramiah and Reich (2006) in their study
of HIV/AIDS partnership in Botswana, identified the
need for partners to build relationships, not only at a
technical level but also at operational levels [24]. More
generally, relationships between actors are not technic-
ally determined [25], but are rather constantly influenced
by the relational elements that guide human behaviour
and social relationships [26–28]. In order to understand
the implementation of PPPs, it is important, then, to
understand the factors influencing relationships between
the actors involved within them. The complexity of these
relationships can best be understood by applying
multi-disciplinary perspectives drawing on insights from
social theory. Although several studies have demonstrated
the relevance of social theory, and anthropological per-
spectives in understanding health policy-making and im-
plementation [25, 29–37], the use of social theory remains
limited in policy implementation studies.
Against this backdrop, this paper aims, first, to dem-
onstrate how social theory can aid understanding of the
complex relationships of actors involved in the imple-
mentation of public-private partnerships – focusing on
the implementation of the national policy for engaging
the private sector in Tuberculosis control in India. Rela-
tionship is a crucial element of governance, and relation-
ship building an important aspect of partnerships. So
the paper also draws conclusions from this analysis
relevant to the governance of PPPs.
Methods
Theoretical framing
To aid inquiry into the local level implementation of
PPPs, this paper draws on theoretical insights from
Pierre Bourdieu’s ‘theory of practice’. Bourdieu (a French
anthropologist and social theorist) was interested in un-
derstanding the complex relationships between the indi-
vidual and society, considering the interaction between
agency (individuals’ independent ability to make deci-
sions and free choices [38]) and structure (‘structure’ is
responsible for shaping individual behavior, and that it
restricts the choices made by individuals [39]). In the
process of his studies, he conceptualized four interre-
lated concepts of field, habitus, capital and doxa to
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explain how social practices are constructed in and
through the relationships within particular areas of so-
cial life [40]. Pierre Bourdieu’s work focuses on the rela-
tion between structure and agency [41–43]. He was in
favour of finding a balance between the two positions,
and viewed the relationship between structure and
agency as dynamic and recursive – structure influences
human behaviour, and humans are capable of changing
the social structures they inhabit.
According to Bourdieu, individuals (actors) have posi-
tions in groups, groups have positions in field and fields
are positioned in relation to each other in society. Fields
can be defined in different ways – e.g., a geographic lo-
cation, set of activities, organization, religion, or lifestyle,
etc. However, a field is essentially a specific space of re-
lationships, a ‘site of struggle’, a type of battlefield where
the positions in it compete over, contest, construct, in-
fluence, and have power to improve their positions [40].
His notion of ‘habitus’ refers to ‘cognitive structures’ that
individuals use to deal with the outer social world and
these structures are formed based on their past experi-
ences within and across social fields [42]. Another im-
portant concept is that of ‘capital’ [44], referring to ‘the
resources and assets within particular fields which actors
struggle to acquire and through which they “play the
game” within each field’ [40]. Bourdieu extends his con-
cept of capital beyond the notion of material assets to:
economic capital (money and property); cultural capital
(cultural goods and services, including educational cre-
dentials); social capital (networks and acquaintances);
and symbolic capital (honor, prestige or recognition)
[45]. Bourdieu’s concept of capital is useful for this ana-
lysis of PPP implementation because he explicitly links
social capital to ‘interconnectedness’ – to the networks
and relationships a person is part of and the position
they hold within such networks [44]. The last concept of
‘doxa’ is the combination of unstated, unconscious,
taken for granted assumptions, norms, and beliefs that
are perceived by the individual as ‘common sense’ or
self-evident [42]. In this paper, we specifically apply
Bourdieu’s theoretical concepts of field and capital to
gain a deeper understanding of the social processes in-
volved in the implementation of PPM-TB policy.
Study setting
The study was conducted within a district in a Southern
state of India due to its decade old history of PPM for
TB control. To safeguard the anonymity and confidenti-
ality of the respondents the study site will be left
unnamed. More specifically, in order to conduct thor-
ough in-depth and focused work, fieldwork was
conducted in one of the nine TB Units (TU) established
within the study district.
Each TU covers an approximate population of 0.5 mil-
lion and each consists of four to five Designated Micros-
copy Centres (DMCs).2. In consultation with the District
programme managers, the DBR TU was selected as an
area for detailed exploration of partnership implementa-
tion. The DBR TU covers a population of 405,230 (0.4
million) and is spread across four DMCs, one of them
being run by NGO-A in partnership with the TB
programme. In addition, there were other government
run health facilities3 and a huge numbers of individual
private clinics (approx. 300), and private diagnostic cen-
tres operating in the nearby areas surrounding the
DMCs. There were also substantial numbers of private
nursing homes, and a couple of big corporate hospitals.
Data collection
Fieldwork is at the heart of the discipline of anthropol-
ogy, wherein an anthropologist goes to the field and
stays with the people whom s/he wants to study [46]. As
Hammersley [47] states, ‘The task [of ethnographers] is
to document the culture, the perspectives and practices,
of the people in these settings. The aim is to “get inside”
the way each group of people see the world’ (quoted in
Reeves et al., 2008:337). The fieldwork period for this
study encompassed making links and interacting
with the respondents across public, private and
non-government organisation (NGO) sectors, engaging
with them on a day to day basis, and becoming part of
their lives. The respondents included: frontline staff
from the TB programme; District Programme Managers;
Private Practitioners (General Physicians and Chest phy-
sicians) and representatives of Medical Associations; and
Partner NGOs.
The research was conducted over a period of fourteen
months from October 2010 up until December 2011,
collecting information at the field site using various
qualitative methods, including: participant observations,
informal interactions, in-depth Interviews, and focus
group discussions (FGDs). Interview guides focused on
understanding of partnerships from the respondents’
perspective and how they experienced its implementa-
tion at district level. Participant observation served as an
important technique for cross-checking and verifying
the information provided by participants during informal
interactions or individual interviews. Meticulous notes
were maintained in field diaries to capture all informa-
tion that was heard and observed, and to build reflective
thoughts upon them. Taking field notes of all that was
seen and heard was intertwined with the entire process
of data collection, and proved essential to bring out the
rich context of the data collected [48]. A total of 68
in-depth Interviews were conducted in English and
Hindi language, were tape recorded, and preceded by in-
formed verbal/written consent.
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Data analysis
All recorded interviews were transcribed word for word.
In analyzing the policy at the ‘implementation’ level, we
relied on thematic analysis [49]. Data coding was done
using thematic analysis and then constantly compared
with data from participant observation and notes from
field diaries. Themes were identified using a manual
method by back and forth reading of data, without using
any computer program. Commonalties, meanings and
patterns within the interview transcripts and field were
identified. These commonalities were then coded, para-
graph by paragraph.
Given the exploratory nature of the research, we opted
to use an inductive and interpretive approach in analysis
to generate, first, what Clifford Geertz calls ‘thick de-
scription’ [50] of day to day work patterns and behaviour
of frontline actors; their working relations and their ex-
perience of the entire partnership process. However, the
description itself does not provide an explanation or in-
terpretation of observed actions and behaviour. To take
us from ‘thick descriptions’ to the development of
empirically-based, real life representative and insightful
explanations, we used Bourdieu’s theoretical concepts of
field and capital to interpret our findings. The applica-
tion of social theories in this way ‘provide complex and
comprehensive conceptual understandings of things
that cannot be pinned down: how societies work, how
organisations operate, why people interact in certain
ways’ [51].
Ethical considerations
Close attention was paid in respecting ethical consid-
erations for social science research [52]. In a formal
interview setting the right to informed consent was
strictly observed: written or verbal consent was
sought from the respondents giving them as much in-
formation about the purpose of the interview, the es-
timated time required, and the outcome of the study.
Measures to safeguard the anonymity and confidenti-
ality of the respondents were observed at all times
during the fieldwork and data analysis process. Ethical
clearance for this study was obtained from the Insti-
tutional Ethics Committee of the London School of
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM), London,
UK and the Local Indian Ethics Committee.
Results and discussion
The result section has been divided into four major
themes in line with the theoretical insights from Bour-
dieu’s ‘theory of practice’. The RNTCP in India is one of
the 13 National Health Programmes implemented by the
Department of Health, under the Ministry of Health and
Family Welfare (MOHFW). The RNTCP is led by the
Central TB Division (CTD) that coordinates the imple-
mentation of the programme (Fig. 1). The state, district
and sub-district, and peripheral health institutions then
implement the TB programme. At the district and
sub-district levels, the RNTCP is well integrated into the
general health system and can be considered the crucial
Fig. 1 PPM-TB Implementation at the Study Site
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level of health service delivery, where vertical health pro-
grammes and policy intentions are translated into prac-
tices [53]. NGOs can collaborate with a programme and
adopt schemes as large as running Culture and DST
labs, to schemes as small as running a sputum collection
centre. Similarly, private practitioners (PPs) can refer
suspected TB cases for sputum samples to RNTCP des-
ignated microscopy centre (DMC) and, if willing, can act
as Directly Observed Treatment Short-course (DOTS)
providers for patients diagnosed with TB and initiated
on DOTS.
Conceptualising PPM-TB as a ‘field’
For Bourdieu, it is essential to study the social space
(field) where interactions, transactions, and events
take place. Drawing on Bourdieu’s concept of field,
here we will consider PPM-TB as ‘the field’ itself,
where various individuals come to play a role in rela-
tion to each other by taking certain positions. The
PPM-TB policy guidelines encourage the public sector
(RNTCP) to strengthen the referral systems (Fig. 1)
between the public, private and NGO sectors, to pro-
vide standardised diagnosis and treatment service, and
improve the quality of frontline service delivery [54].
Over the years, the PPM-TB policy has evolved and
its scope has broadened to include actors across dif-
ferent sectors and at different levels having varying
roles and responsibilities (Table 1).
The policy guidelines for the involvement of PPs and
NGOs, highlight the crucial role of the District TB Of-
ficer (DTO) and the Frontline TB Workers (FTWs) in
building and maintaining sustainable partnerships. In
addition to district programme managers, FTWs work-
ing in the TB units and designated microscopy centres
(DMCs), are also seen as the ‘face’ of the programme at
the field level. They come into day-to-day contact with
the PPs and NGOs to develop both formal and informal
partnerships. Although the FTWs role in PP involve-
ment may appear to be quite mechanical, it neverthe-
less requires a lot of time and effort to build
relationships with the PPs and then subsequently to
maintain those relationships.
Although we might conceive of the PPM-TB as ‘the
field’, it also represents an intersection between the
relatively discrete fields of the public, private and
NGO sectors. These three sectors tend to be consid-
ered as fields, however, within these fields there are
several smaller fields that can’t be ignored. For ex-
ample, within the public sector field, a TB unit could
be seen as a field in itself or even district level TB
activity could be perceived as a field. Similarly, in the
private sector, the Indian Medical Association (IMA)
could be seen as a field.
Individuals and ‘capital’ resources
Individuals operating across fields had varying expertise
and, drawing on Bourdieu’s thinking, possessed different
types of capital resources.
‘We are the pillars of the programme…’
The FTWs were the ones who knew the ins and outs
of the programme at the implementation stage. They
identified themselves as ‘pillars of the programme’ be-
ing part of the wider community whom they were
serving, and further considered their responsibility
not only towards the patients alone, but also towards
society itself. The TB programme was not merely
viewed as a workplace, but also as an opportunity to
serve the community, to learn new things that would
be treasured for a lifetime. A senior FTW, who had
been a regular government employee and was now
part of the TB programme, expressed his feelings of
working with the TB programme:
…but in this entire service, the TB service will remain
as a memory. Apart from all government employees
in all other programmes, I understand that the one
who is working in TB is the one working hard and no
one else works like him. Work happens promptly in
the TB programmes. [Interview, Multi-Purpose Health
Supervisor-3]
FTWs asserted that TB being a very serious prob-
lem, those working in the TB programme needed to
have a service-oriented approach. They regarded their
intentions to be service-oriented describing it as
‘manava seva madhava seva’ [‘Service to man is ser-
vice to God’] and in an FGD collectively claimed to
be working with ‘full loyalty’. All FTWs felt ‘satisfied’
that their hard work not only healed the patients’ ill-
nesses but also brought happiness into their patients’
lives. They saw the reward for their hard work in
terms of the long-term relationships that they devel-
oped with the patients.
…Above all, our patients get cured. They give us a
blessing that is good for us. What is money? Even if
the patient says, "Namaste Anna" ['hello brother'],
that is more satisfying… [Interview, TB Health
Visitor-1]
Being pillars of the programme, they were in close
relationship with the community and with patients
and regarded themselves as the crucial staff in the
delivery of the programme. Similarly, NGOs who were
working in close proximity with the community and
patients, identified themselves as the vital link in the
TB programme.
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‘We have a watchdog role …’
NGOs perceived themselves as ‘true partners’ to the
programme. They took pride in their contribution in
bringing a high level of TB awareness among the
community; for establishing linkages between com-
munity and the government; for developing the com-
munity DOTS programme; and for advocating
changes in the RNTCP policy. In terms of the policy
continuum, NGOs saw themselves positioned ‘at the
service end’ that enabled them to work closely with
the ‘common man’. The phrase of reaching the “com-
mon man” also reflected their intention of reaching
those marginalised, vulnerable and beyond the reach
of public sector..
…We have administrative machinery from top to
bottom to deliver the services to the common man.
Unfortunately, they don’t reach the right people who
should benefit from such services. So we have a
watchdog role, to see that these services reach the right
man... [Interview, Chief Executive Officer, NGO-C)
Partnering NGOs, however, saw their role not only in
contributing at the level of service provision but also at
the level of policy revision. Over a decade ago, NGO-A
had initiated a pilot experiment establishing a sputum
collection centre (SCC) in a remote and difficult to
reach area. This initiative came under one of their pro-
jects funded by an international funder. After evaluating
Table 1 Role & Responsibility of Actors within the PPM-TB Policy
Actors Role & Responsibility
District TB Officers (DTOs) • Key person in programme implementation, holding crucial responsibility for: identifying the partners; developing
links with them; and maintaining sustainable partnerships.
• He or she also holds the responsibility of calling the District TB Control Society meetings on a quarterly basis and
for inviting the partner NGOs to these meetings.
Frontline TB Workers
(FTWs)
• Provide feedback to PPs referring TB suspects
○ If the patient doesn’t have TB, then the FTW gives that feedback to the referring PP;
○ If the patient is diagnosed with TB, the FTW then requests the referring PP to be a DOTS provider.
○ If the PP shows unwillingness, then in such cases the FTWs take consent from the referring PPs and place the
patient’s box in another nearby DOTS centre. The FTW then counsels the patient that if he/she has any other
problems, s/he should see the referring PP for any other side drugs other than TB medicines.
• Identify a DOTS provider depending on the patient’s willingness and convenience
○ A DOTS provider could be anyone, from a shop keeper to a qualified medical practitioner.
○ Once the patient shows stability in treatment, and if willing, then the field staff shifts his/her treatment box
to a DOTS centre nearest to his/her house.
○ They further explain the DOTS provider that the patient’s need to be given drugs on alternate days.
• Follow up with DOTS providers
○ The FTW visits regularly to follow up on the case until treatment is completed.
○ The FTW then reports the successful completion of the treatment to the STS.
• Provide honorarium to DOTS providers
○ The FTW updates the STS about the DOTS providers’ supervision.
○ The STS prepares a list of all such PPs every quarter and sends it to the District TB office for release of the
PP honorarium.
○ Within 3 to 6 months, the FTW receives a Cheque in hand, which he hands over to the DOTS providers
in person and take their signatures on the vouchers to be returned back to the District TB office as a sign
of proof.
Private Practitioners (PPs) • The PP can get involved in a single activity or in multiple activities depending on his or her capacity, interest and
the requirements of the programme.
○ Be a DOTS provider - the PPs are expected to ensure follow-up sputum collection and late patient retrieval,
as well as to maintain RNTCP records for the patients and to permit on-site monitoring by RNTCP supervisory
staff as per RNTCP guidelines.
○ Be a referring provider- refer TB suspects for diagnosis and treatment, irrespective of whether the client is
diagnosed as having TB in private labs or not.
○ Be a DOTS provider, and refer TB suspects.
• Practitioners who support as DOTS providers receives an honorarium of Rs. 250 per case (US$ 3.9) that has been
successfully completed, whereas, in the case of MDR, the amount goes up to Rs. 1000 per case (US$ 15.9) [54].
Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGOs)
• NGOs play an important role in supporting the RNTCP by making treatment more accessible to TB patients through
various strategies and programmes, including community-based DOTS.
• The RNTCP maintains a formal relationship with NGOs through signing a memorandum of understanding (MoU).
• As per the revised schemes for PP/NGO involvement, NGOs can opt for a single scheme or multiple schemes
depending upon their experience and capacity.
○ The RNTCP pays on a quarterly-basis for the particular scheme that is opted for.
○ The duration of agreement is one year and is renewable.
○ The NGOs need to re-apply to the District TB Office for funding each year.
• The applications are made to the district TB offices, and are renewed only after being signed by the District
Magistrate/Collector.
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their initiatives, they found that the concept of the SCC
was practical and feasible, and later advocated for SCC
at state and national level in several discussion forums.
They were finally able to contribute this concept of an
SCC as a policy component within the TB programme.
...We have got some successful models. One, the
sputum collection centre, which we started in early
2000, has now been included into the revised NGO/
PP policy guidelines... [Interview, Chief Executive
Office, NGO-A]
Reflecting on the above two sub-themes through Bour-
dieu’s perspective, the relationships that the FTWs and
NGOs developed with the community and patients,
brought them social recognition that enhanced their
capital over time. Bourdieu defines this as:
'The aggregate of the actual or potential resources
which are linked to possessions of a durable network
of more or less institutionalized relationships of
mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other
words to membership of a group – which provides
each of its members with the backing of the
collectively-owned capital, a “credential” which enti-
tles them to credit, in the various senses of the world.
'[44:249].
In addition to the involvement of NGOs in the TB con-
trol programme, the Indian Medical Association (IMA)
and private practitioners (PPs) were also considered to
be important partners.
‘We are not running a parallel programme…’
The IMA’s involvement was spoken of and supported
by national programme managers and policy-makers.
The IMA was actively involved in training allopathic
practitioners. A representative of the medical associ-
ation mentioned that ‘we are not running a parallel
programme, but a support programme’. Similarly, PPs
perceived themselves to be important healthcare pro-
viders, and viewed themselves in different roles within
the PPM TB policy: ‘to guide patients’; ‘to promote
them’; ‘to save patients from every corner’; ‘to show
them the right direction’, and so on.
…Very important, because the major chunk comes
from private practitioners, people seldom go to big
hospitals, corporate hospitals, and mostly they don’t
prefer government institutions... [Interview, Dr. TA,
Ayurvedic Practitioner]
The private practitioners considered themselves to be
more accessible and approachable to patients when
compared to the government institutions. Medical prac-
tice in general, all over the globe, holds a prime position
in the professional hierarchy [55]. In his theory of pro-
fessionalisation, Freidson [56] argued that ‘occupational
groups, such as medicine, had previously engaged in a
process of professionalisation to secure exclusive owner-
ship of specific areas of knowledge and expertise’ [51].
Private medical practitioners in India continue to be
respected based on their educational background and
professional authority, and they hold ‘symbolic capital’
based on their prestigious position in society. In Bour-
dieu’s term, we can consider the educational background
and professional authority of private practitioners as a
form of capital. In addition, the profession is also associ-
ated with high financial gain which adds to the existing
capital. The aggregate of these capitals that PPs hold to-
gether, have contributed to their social status and pos-
ition within society.
The FTWs, PPs, and NGOs justified their own posi-
tions. Their ‘self-representation’4was not only a way to
project their strengths but also a way to highlight weak-
ness on the part of others.
Unrecognized capital resources
Bourdieu (1984) cautions that the resources or capital
one may possess in one field may be recognised or
remain unrecognised in another field [42]. This theme
demonstrates how having to engage with and work
within the PPM-TB field, dislocated actors and there-
fore their social, cultural and symbolic capital retained
within their individual fields was undervalued. Being
undervalued, they felt demotivated and constantly
struggled to find meanings in their association with
the programme.
‘We need freedom to prescribe …’
The experience of the PPs and their professional role
in the medical field helps to shed more light on this
dislocation of position. ‘Standard of care’ is the key
factor that guides the medical profession [57], and is
defined as ‘generally accepted principles for medical
management’ [58]. Medical practitioners generally
have the authority to make treatment decisions based
on their individual professional judgement and
expertise – and their ‘professional standing is rooted
in its cultural authority, a form of legitimacy that
enables physicians to make judgments of meaning
and value and have these held to be true and
valid’(Haplern [59] p.843). However, the educational
background and professional status that PPs possessed
within the medical field, was undervalued in the
PPM-TB field.
For example, the entire idea of referring those sus-
pected of having TB to government health facilities, and
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if diagnosed then to put them on standardised DOTS
medicines, in a way challenged the traditional medical
role of PPs as it gave them less freedom to prescribe or
to decide on referrals. PPs asserted that such an ap-
proach in terms of their role in TB management not
only decentralised the programme but also despecialised
the skills of the PPs. A senior physician who has
long-term experience of managing TB patients in his
own clinics within the private regimen asserted:
...As a private doctor, I am not interested in 250/- Rs.
What I need is the freedom to prescribe for my
patients. [Interview, Dr VK, Allopathic Practitioner]
The ‘little flexibility’ in allowing PPs to prescribe TB
treatment on their own, or using their own system of
medicine as a supportive treatment (in the case of
PPs trained in Ayurveda and Homoeopathy trained),
can be seen as a process of undervaluing their educa-
tional capability as well as their professional skills.
Our recent paper published elsewhere draws more at-
tention to PPs perspectives about their involvement in
the TB programme, highlighting the challenges of be-
ing undervalued by the programme [60]. Similar expe-
riences, where PPs have felt undervalued in the TB
programme, have been reported in other studies con-
ducted in India and elsewhere [19, 61]. Although PPs
got involved in the PPM-TB initiative, they were least
interested or motivated by the financial incentives
given by the programme.
‘Our level is different; their level is different.’
Similarly, the position of FTWs was more complex in the
PPM-TB field. FTWs are not primarily trained as market-
ing executives; rather, they are TB workers trained to work
in TB units and DMCs, but also have to operate at the
margins of the public-private interface. Having to engage
with, and work within, the PPM TB field dislocates them.
In the absence of cultural capital and knowledge of the
policy, as well as a lack of skills in dealing with PPs, FTWs
feared that the symbolic capital they possessed within the
TU field was undervalued in the private sector field, giving
them a sense of inferiority.
...Yes because as a Senior Treatment Supervisor, I
cannot go directly to a private practitioner and tell
him [to refer cases]…but if my Medical Officer comes
with me and talks to the private practitioners,
something may happen, that is there... our level is
different; their level is different. [Interview, Senior
Treatment Supervisor-2]
All FTWs, including the Senior Treatment Supervisors,
often exhibited an inferiority complex when they entered
the field of the PPs. This inferiority complex was greater
in dealing with allopathic practitioners, who were consid-
ered to be busy, arrogant at times, and lacked interest.
[Excerpt from Field Diary, Thursday, 26 May 2011]
‘I accompanied the STS to the field for follow-up
visits. As we entered the first MBBS doctor’s clinic, I
saw the practitioner was sitting very professionally on
his swivel chair, well dressed in a shirt and tie and a
stethoscope hanging around his neck, and his arms
resting on a clean table. The moment the STS greeted
him, rather than offering a welcoming response, he
took on a complaining tone. He very rudely informed
the STS about how the DOTS patient had not been
coming regularly to his clinic to take his alternate day
doses, and as a result he wanted the STS to carry his
box back to the TB unit and to deal with the patient
accordingly thereafter. The poor STS had no voice
nor authority to convince him, and had to take the
box back with him.’
FTWs made distinctions between the allopathic practi-
tioners and non-allopathic practitioners, mentioning that
among the non-allopath, RMP doctors were well associ-
ated with the programme as compared to MBBS, MD,
Chest Physicians. In an FGD, all FTWs jointly voiced
that, ‘In this programme 80 % help is from RMPs only…
but…from specialists 0 % support…’.
‘Government agreements are more of an entanglement…’
NGOs were working in close proximity with the com-
munity and patients and regarded themselves as the cru-
cial link in the entire programme. In Bourdieu’s term
these relations that NGOs developed with the commu-
nity and patients brought them social recognition that
enhanced their Social Capital over the time. However,
lack of acknowledgment and least support by the district
authorities undermined NGOs social capital that they
carried with them to the programme.
NGO Partners felt that the system failed to recog-
nise their contribution, to the extent that the district
programme managers failed to acknowledge their ef-
forts and hard work. In the absence of a proper refer-
ral recording system at the DMCs, partners felt
de-motivated. They questioned the value of the part-
nerships and whether the government was truly com-
mitted to it or not; however, whenever an NGO
contributed at the field level, it was always taken as
the work of the government.
…They [programme managers] are not at all open in
sharing their opinion about the partners' contribution
[to the programme]. Some programme managers
acknowledge the contribution, but some still say that,
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“Ok, NGO-C has done some activities, but mostly
they [government] are contributing…” [Interview, Pro-
ject Coordinator, NGO-C]
The experiences of the partners concerning the par-
ticipation of the DTOs and their unresponsive behav-
iour, led them to feel that their relationships with the
programme was undervalued and denigrated. During
14 months of fieldwork, it was observed that, four Dis-
trict TB Officers (DTOs) had been transferred. Partners
identified a change in the DTO’s leadership as a process
where responsibility was transferred to Collectors and
non-state partners, limiting the DTO’s power and
authority to make decisions. Partners asserted that the
Collector, being the chairperson of the District TB con-
trol society, had the sole signatory power over signing
of the MoUs. Partners expected renewal to happen
automatically based on their performance and along
the guidelines, however, considering the busy schedule
of Collector, the renewal of MoUs got delayed upto
several months.
...our role is to mobilize communities, NGOs, CBOs, to
sensitize them and they have applied for the schemes,
but it is lying at the district control society because the
initiative has not been taken by the DTCO or if the
DTCO takes the initiative then it is blocked at the
Collector’s level… [Interview, Director, NGO-A]
NGO-A holds a long-term relationship with the
programme in terms of supporting them by running five
DMCs across the district. However, it was observed that
the Project Associate at the field office had to make sev-
eral visits to the district TB Centre (DTC) to get the
MoUs signed.
The signing of MoUs is associated with the release of
funds. The delay caused in getting the MoUs signed pro-
longed the release of funds. NGO-A mentioned that for
them, being a big organisation, in times of delays they
continued to manage their activities with money they re-
ceived from other independent projects within the or-
ganisation. However, they felt concerned about several
other grassroots organisations whose survival depended
on the programme funds only.
Partners felt that these hurdles not only delayed the
process, but also created an uncertainty about whether the
MoU would be renewed or not, or whether finances
would be released or not. That is the most pressing ques-
tion for the NGOs, and its effects tend to demoralize the
NGOs, giving them a feeling that ‘getting into an agree-
ment with the government is more of an entanglement’.
We can say that the diverse groups of actors entrusted
with carrying out the implementation of the TB partner-
ship were operating within the capital resources available
in their respective fields. However, their contributions
towards programme implementation tended to be poorly
recognised, placing them in a position where they felt in-
ferior to other partners.
PPM-TB field: ‘site of struggle’
In Bourdieu’s work, a field is a ‘site of struggle’ in which
various social actors compete over, contest and construct
and influence power, to preserve or overturn the existing
distribution of capital. As a response to this misrecogni-
tion in the PPM TB field, and in order to maintain their
positions, frontline actors used various mechanisms and
strategies at the individual and organisational levels.
One of the critical properties of the field, as mentioned
by Wacquant [39:8] is also ‘its degree of autonomy, i.e.,
the capacity it has gained, in the course of its develop-
ment, to insulate itself from external influences and to
uphold its own criteria of evaluation.’ The medical pro-
fession in India is a diverse group of practitioners, each
practicing different systems of medicine. The market
forces govern the private sector and breed competition
so that the practitioners are forced to adapt and to cre-
ate space for themselves [62].
The IMA can be considered as an individual field
within the private medical sector. It enjoys its autonomy
based on cultural and symbolic capital. The professional
identity and authority that the IMA retains in its mind-
set can be witnessed in their actions at association level,
as well as in the actions of individual practitioners.
IMA professionalism
At the national level, it is the IMA that takes responsi-
bility for involving the allopathic practitioners. The IMA
has played a powerful role in maintaining the status quo
of allopathic medicine (western medicine), to such an
extent that they have opposed those outside the purview
of allopathic medicine from practicing allopathy. In re-
cent years, the IMA has strongly lobbied against the le-
galisation of unqualified medical practitioners and their
utilisation in any health programme [63–65] and have
even dismissed them as ‘qualified quacks’ [59].
Involvement of non-allopathic practitioners still does
not constitute a strong focus at the policy level, and thus
they remain excluded from the policy stream. A
policy-maker, commenting on the involvement of
non-allopathic practitioners, acknowledged that they are
the major source of referral of TB patients and their
contribution to the programme is substantial. However,
the policy-maker had reservations about legally incorp-
orating the involvement of non-allopathic practitioners
into the written policy documents, due to pressures
from the IMA.
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...When we were writing up private practitioners
schemes, we refrained from putting that [involvement
of informal providers], because the moment it enters
into the government document, the IMA will come
down strongly against us, saying that we are legalizing
quackery. So it will not be in any written documents,
but the fact is that we are very well aware of it and we
recognize their work in the field. A huge chunk of TB
patients goes to them only, they are the first point of
contact, so we always say and we always advise the
programme officers, that they have to be included,
they should be the DOTS provider, or the referral
points. But you will not find it in any of the schemes
as such, because then it is against the ethics...
[Interview, National level PPM-TB Consultant -2]
NGO-B, based on their field experience of training the
non-allopathic practitioner’s, elaborated on this gap in
policy, where non-allopathic practitioners were never
considered as legitimate potential partners.
...We identify RMPs, whether the government
recognizes or not. You know the medical call, I mean
the institute, they don’t count them as real partners in
the RNTCP... [Interview, Programme Officer, NGO-B]
IMA’s ability to maintain their professional authority is
based on their educational and professional profile. It
not only hinders the TB programme’s ability to reach
them, but also obstructs the programme’s relationship to
those outside the allopathic system. Their professional
authority has hindered the potential of creating a part-
nership policy that encompasses all healthcare providers.
Private practitioners authority
In terms of the PPM-TB policy, allopathic practitioners
fail to participate fully because of the programme’s in-
flexibility in prescribing private treatment. However, they
continue to enjoy their autonomy in their capacity to
self-manage TB cases by referring only those cases which
they feel need to be referred.
As per the RNTCP guideline, the DOTS provider is
expected to ensure follow-up sputum collection, late pa-
tient retrieval, maintain RNTCP records for the patients,
and permit on-site monitoring by RNTCP supervisory
staff. FTWs, however, had observed that the PPs consid-
ered the updating of cards to be an additional task and
often showed unwillingness to keep the DOTS boxes.
However, in the interest of the patient’s convenience,
FTWs had to negotiate with the PPs and take up the re-
sponsibility of updating the cards, leaving the responsi-
bility of dispensing the medicines with the PPs. This was
observed on one occasion when the researcher
accompanied the field staff for a follow up with a PP
DOTS provider at his clinic.
[Excerpt from Field Diary, Friday, 4 February 2011]
'Dr KMC is a senior homeopathic doctor. When we
entered the clinic he was setting the medicine on the
shelf. FTW greeted him and spoke a few words and
came out of his cabin. In the waiting hall there was a
metal cupboard [usually a book rack] in which all
medicines were kept. Over this cupboard two DOTS
boxes were placed. FTW stretched out his hand,
pulled the first box and placed it on the bench. He
opened the box; the duplicate treatment card was
folded inside it, and was covered with dust on one
side. FTW wiped off the dust with his hands and
unfolded the card to see the tick marks. There were
no tick marks after Dec. 2010. He counted the strips
and looking at me commented, "patients drugs nahi
kha raha" ['patient is not taking the drugs']. He then
dialled the Lab Technician’s number at the DMC and
asked him to give him the details (dates and results)
of sputum follow-up test of patient number 462. The
technician gave the results and FTW updated the
treatment card. He closed the box and placed it back
on the cupboard, and then repeated the same proced-
ure for the next box.'
Although PPs who were referring patients to the
DMCs/ DOTS programme, they enjoyed their
autonomy in terms of which patient were to be sent
and which would not be sent. They supported DOTS
in principle, but in practice made no efforts to
counsel and encourage patients to go to the DOTS
centres. Although PPs mentioned their role in coun-
seling the patient and giving them a choice to select
their treatment provider based on affordability, patient
decisions were mostly influenced by PPs own individ-
ual judgements.
FTW discretion in approaching PPs
FTWs were often working in resource-limited settings
and, at the same time, were pressured by programme
policies. A lack of human and financial resources not
only hampered routine ‘fieldwork’, but also demotivated
them from taking on new activities [66].
As a routine practice, and based on their experiences
with PPs in general, FTWs occasionally only visited PPs
who had DOTS boxes in their clinics and often excluded
those who were not keeping DOTS boxes. Furthermore,
there were no active attempts by programme staff to go
and sensitise PPs who had never been DOTS providers
or referred any cases, leaving a large number of PPs out-
side the purview of the programme. One day while in
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the field, it was observed that besides a DOTS provider’s
residence, there were two other clinics run by MBBS
doctors. The researcher looked at the fieldworker and
asked him, ‘do they have any of our DOTS boxes?’ He
replied, ‘I never went there.’ One reason for this kind of
approach may be attributed to not having appropriate
training relevant to the PPM-TB policy.
The involvement of PPs was seen primarily from the
perspective of simply meeting targets, rather than build-
ing a long-term relationship to enhance capacities. One
afternoon the first author was returning with a member
of the field staff from a field visit. During the conversa-
tion, he posed an informal question: ‘So do you go to see
these PPs regularly?’ The field staff member replied, ‘If
fewer numbers of patients come then we go around in
the field to visit private doctors in this area ‘. This un-
derstanding of visiting PPs just to achieve targets was in-
fused into their day to day practices.
…To involve means increasing the cases...what
doctors [Higher Officers] tell us is that at each centre
there has to be minimum of 10-15 sputum positive
cases… from ‘Out Patient’ we only get 2-3 cases. So to
get more cases we need to approach the PPs... [Inter-
view, TB Health Visitor-2]
It was surprising to observe in the above quote that this
mind-set that the PPs need to be approached only when
the programme needs additional cases, originated from
the top level, showing that there is a poor understating
of what this partnership entails. Throughout the field-
work, the researchers did not find any new PP being
added to the list of DOTS providers, neither did they
witness any FTW approaching a new PP to sensitise
him/her about the TB facilities at the DMCs.
In principle, FTWs approved of the PPM-TB policy,
however, in practice they showed a negative attitude to-
wards PPs and NGOs, and limited the amount of field
visits they made. Other studies show similar behaviour
amongst frontline staff [67, 68]. Field observations and
informal interactions with actors have shown that the in-
tegration of the PPM-TB policy into routine TB work fo-
cused little on building effective relationships.
The autonomy of NGOs
As discussed in the earlier sections, NGOs capital, on
the one hand, was undervalued by the public sector in
the PPM-TB field, while the public sector and the fun-
ders still expected them to perform well. NGOs often
struggled to strike a balance between fulfilling the expec-
tations of the programme and meeting the performance
targets of their funders. As coping strategies, firstly, they
developed their own mechanisms to achieve the targets,
and secondly, to maintain their identity they kept a
distance from other partner NGOs (least collaborating
with them). To give an example, a senior public sector
Chest Physician (CP) who also holds an established pri-
vate practice, regularly referred his TB suspects to the
NGO run DMC for sputum testing. Once tested and
based on his judgement, he asked the patient to either
continue the treatment at the DMC or to start the TB
treatment at his clinic. On average he referred 25% of di-
agnosed cases to the DMC for initiation of DOTS. Being
associated with the public sector, he understood that the
core value of sputum examination is to correctly diag-
nose TB. However, he was not in favour of the RNTCP
alternate day regimes.
In accordance with the RNTCP guidelines, any cli-
ent that gets tested has to be first registered in the
Outpatient register, followed by the lab register. If the
client is sputum positive, s/he has to be put on
DOTS, which is the responsibility of the frontline
staff at the DMC. If the Chest Physician refers a case,
and the case is diagnosed as sputum positive, how
does the person begin treatment, and how does the
Lab Technician manage the register? A Lab Techni-
cian mentioned that whenever a case was referred by
the Chest Physician, he did the investigations first,
without registering the patient details in the lab regis-
ter. Once TB diagnosis was confirmed then he con-
sulted the Chest Physician and if he decided that the
patient could be retained by the DMC, only then did
the Lab technician registered the client. In contrast, if
the suspect was diagnosed to be without TB, then the
Lab technician registered the client without consult-
ing the Chest Physician. This also meant that patients
who continued to be treated by the Chest Physician
were confirmed to have TB by the DMC centre first,
yet they were not documented in the lab registers.
The Laboratory technician was asked how this action
benefited the DMC. He replied that the Chest Physician
refers a substantial number of cases for DOTS. If they
were to ignore testing his private clients, then the NGO
might not get any referrals from him in the future. The
NGO-A DMC needed cases to achieve quarterly targets
and the Private Practitioners needed business. This situ-
ation revealed how the situation was managed mutually
and informally by going beyond the policy norms. The
Private Practitioners brought their professional authority
to bear, making the NGO-DMC dependent on them for
their case load.
The informal referral model between the PPs and
NGO-DMC provides a crucial learning scenario. From a
top-down (structural) perspective, it can be viewed as a
violation of the PPM-TB policy guidelines, however,
from a bottom-up perspective (agency) it was successful,
as it maintained strong relationships between the PPs
and the programme. Both the NGOs and the PPs
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mutually benefitted from it and ultimately delivered the
timely service required by their clients. This story dem-
onstrates Susan Barrett and Colin Fudge’s characterisa-
tion of the relationship between ‘policy and action’ as a
negotiation process [26].
According to Bourdieu’s theory, the Frontline workers
were rewriting the rules of the game in order to safe-
guard their ‘position’ in the field and to augment the
‘position’ of the TB Unit in comparison to the other TB
units. They were breaking the rules by limiting field
visits, developing informal links with PPs, and least co-
ordinating with NGOs, which itself had become the ul-
timate metric in the game operating out at the TB unit.
Conclusions
The nature of this study was exploratory. The main
focus was not on assessing policy outcomes in terms
of successes or failures, but on understanding the in-
dividual voices and challenges different actors face,
and the effect on partner relationships. Drawing on
an anthropological approach it explored the social re-
lationships and interactions among the health work-
force, the values and meanings ascribed to those
relationships, and to the power dynamics within the
health system at the local level.
The strength of the study lies in the insights it pro-
vides through observations and informal interactions
made in the field on a day to day basis as well as its
multi-actor perspective. Unlike other policy implementa-
tion studies where the focus of the work has been on
single actors - e.g., frontline workers [68], programme
managers [69], and health care providers [70] – this
study adopted a multi-actor perspective across different
sectors, seeking to provide a more holistic understanding
of the implementation process of the PPM-TB policy.
The study found that programme managers, frontline
TB workers, NGOs, and private practitioners all had a
crucial role to play in TB partnerships. They were widely
regarded as valued contributors with distinct social
skills and capabilities within their organizations and pro-
fessions. However, their potential contributions towards
programme implementation tended to be unrecognized at
the bottom level of the policy implementation chain.
These actors constantly struggled for recognition and used
different mechanisms to position themselves alongside
other actors within the programme that further compli-
cated the relationships between different actors. To
summarize the analysis, PPM-TB can be seen as ‘the field’
that in itself represents an intersection between the rela-
tively discrete fields of the public, private and NGO sec-
tors. Each of these discrete fields had individual actors
operating within them, who also came to play an import-
ant role in the shared field of PPM-TB. Due to the varying
degrees of ‘capital resources’ available in their particular
field – as well as the shared field – they were constantly
positioning themselves in relation to other actors. Al-
though the different actors were widely regarded as valued
contributors who possessed distinct social skills and cap-
abilities within their organizations and professions, their
potential contributions towards programme implementa-
tion remained poorly recognized, making them feel they
were being poorly treated. As a result, all actors constantly
struggled to find meanings in their involvement with TB
programme and used their different coping strategies to
retain their positions in the shared field of PPM-TB:
FTWs approached PPs selectively; PPs avoided referring
patients; the IMA forced measures at the policy level to
discredit non-allopaths; and NGOs developed their own
referral models.
The application of Bourdieu’s theoretical insights in
this analysis has specifically enabled us to provide a con-
textual understanding of the complex process of policy
implementation at the local level. These insights have
helped us go beyond the field description and look into
the social realties hidden in the implementation process
of public-private partnerships for TB control. They have
specifically helped reveal how the social practices of ac-
tors became routinely embedded and integrated into
their social contexts, and the way they searched for
meanings to characterize their relationships.
The study contributes to our understanding of imple-
mentation of PPP for TB control and builds knowledge to
help policy makers and programme managers strengthen
and effectively implement strategies to enable stronger
governance of these partnerships. The actors entrusted
with carrying out the implementation of a policy or
programme, operate within the capital resources available
to them in their particular professional field. A policy or
programme can only succeed if the positions of those
implementing it are recognized by showing respect to
them, and by indicating that the programme needs their
active participation. Such recognition needs to go hand in
hand by truly involving them, which could include incen-
tives (both economic and non-economic) for their efforts.
This might increase their enthusiasm and make them feel
‘responsibility’ towards the policy/programme they are in-
volved in implementing. If this enthusiasm is supported
by a strong shared vision, through imparting adequate in-
formation about the policy intentions, it will bring mean-
ing to their relationships with other actors, thereby
contributing to a strengthened system.
This above paragraph identified some key relational
elements in the implementation of PPP. These rela-
tional elements are interlinked, exert influence on
each other, and are complex in nature. Further stud-
ies on PPPs should take into account these elements
that would help build a framework for evaluation and
implementation of PPPs.
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Ultimately, the paper argues that in ethnographic
‘implementation’ studies with multi-actor perspectives, a
focus on individual and organizational positions in rela-
tion to others helps to provide a better understanding of
the complex relationships found in partnerships policies
(in low and middle-income countries). This more compre-
hensive understanding of these processes is a prerequisite
for strengthening local health systems through more ef-
fective partnership strategies by bridging the gap between
field-level practices and central policy intentions.
Endnotes
1WHO defines public-private mix (PPM) for TB
control as ‘strategies that link all healthcare entities
within the private and public sectors (including health
providers in other governmental ministries) to national
tuberculosis programmes for expansion of DOTS
activities’ [4:1].
2The Designated Microscopy Centres (DMCs) are the
crucial places where the TB suspect or a TB patient first
comes into contact with the TB programme. The DMCs
could also be seen as a “gateway” or an entry point for
the TB suspect or a TB patient to access the TB diagnos-
tic and treatment services offered by the RNTCP. Any
TB suspect or a TB patient has to go via this route to be
officially enrolled in the TB programme.
3Fifteen Primary Health Institutions (PHIs); three Civil
Dispensaries (CDs); five Urban Health Posts (UHPs);
one Area Hospital (AH); and one Employees’ State In-
surance (ESI) Hospital.
4Self-Representation: As per the Gale Dictionary of
Psychoanalysis, self - representation is ‘the image the
subject has of him or herself based on his her own inter-
pretation. It is one of the factors of the ego and its rep-
resentation as termed “an individual, differentiated, real,
and permanent entity” (Racamier) particularized by a
distinctive history and modes of feeling, thinking, and
doing.’ (Gale T. International Dictionary of Psychoanaly-
sis, 1st Edition. Macmillan Reference USA; 2005.)
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